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Deconstructing Duff & Phelps 
M. Todd Henderson‡ 
 
In his dissent in Jordan v. Duff & Phelps Judge Posner, who this year is celebrating 
his 25th anniversary on the bench, showed why he is regarded as among the keenest of 
our federal judges. This article shows why Posner gets the better of the arguments in this 
classic corporate law chestnut taught in most law school corporate law classes. In 
addition, it offers some new perspectives on Duff & Phelps in light of the developments 
in case law and corporate and securities practice in the decades since the opinion was 
written.  
 First, it sets forth a new theory about the interplay between tag-along rights 
and disclosure. The employee in this case, Jordan, didn’t bargain for “tag-along” rights 
(commonly negotiated elements of shareholder agreements in closely held firms that 
allow minority shareholders to share control premia) when he bought his shares in Duff 
& Phelps, but the court allows him to recover as if he did. This paper shows why courts 
should be reluctant to give sophisticated and informed parties, like Jordan, that actually 
dicker over terms, rights they didn’t want to pay for. The implication of Jordan’s refusal 
to bargain for these rights, and therefore the majority’s ability to keep the control 
premium for itself, goes to disclosure: the more likely it is that the firm can exclude 
Jordan from participating in any change-of-control premium, the less valuable any 
disclosure of inchoate merger plans would be to him.  The court’s conclusion that 
disclosure was valuable to Jordan is undermined by the fact that nothing in law or fact 
suggested that Jordan had a right to share in the spoils of the merger. 
 Second, the paper shows why the structure of the shareholder agreement 
Jordan signed amounted to a waiver of his rights to bring the suit he filed and won. 
Jordan effectively consented to being traded against by those with inside information 
(that is, the firm). By agreeing when he bought the shares to take book value for them at 
some time in the future, Jordan was in effect consenting to trades with the firm at a set 
price in cases in which one or both parties would know that the fair value of the shares 
deviated from book value. This looks like the modern “big boy” letter, which provides a 
basis for much over-the-counter securities practice: two sophisticated parties on opposite 
sides of a securities deal agree to not bring securities fraud claims in the future based on 
the fact that they are “big boys” and know the other might have inside information. Big 
boy letters are widely used and are being accepted by courts as de facto waivers of certain 
securities law claims; a recent development that Posner implicitly suggests in his dissent.  
 Finally, the paper shows why applying theories of insider trading in cases 
involving options at the time of the exercise of the option is inappropriate. Although a 
party to an option contract—Jordan effectively sold a call and bought a put—may be 
engaged in insider trading at the time the derivative contract is executed, finding liability 
for asymmetric information at the time of exercise defeats the entire justification for 
entering into the contract in the first place. The Duff & Phelps rule effectively disables 
the options for parties that have information that makes the options valuable in the first 
place.  
 
                                                 
‡ Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Alison LaCroix, Saul 
Levmore, Tom Miles, and Mark Ramseyer for helpful comments. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Asked to take stock of Judge Posner’s contribution to the law of business, one 
immediately thinks about his contribution to the reconceptualization of antitrust and the 
development of law and economics. Asked to write about his most famous corporate law 
case, one faces a more difficult task. While Posner undoubtedly has written many learned 
and ingenious corporate law opinions, his only canonical opinion is his dissent from 
Judge Easterbrook’s majority opinion in Jordan v Duff and Phelps, Inc.1 
Duff & Phelps considers whether a closely held firm must disclose to an employee-
shareholder inchoate merger negotiations before buying shares from that shareholder, 
pursuant to an agreement that required the shareholder to sell back shares at a set price 
upon leaving the firm. The majority wanted to decide this case on simple grounds by 
employing a close-corporation exception from the general rule for publicly traded firms: 
that no disclosure is required until the deal is basically done because premature disclosure 
might destroy the deal or even prevent it from happening in the first place. The court 
concluded that disclosure yields less potential mischief in closely held firms, and that this 
militates in favor of earlier disclosure. To get here, however, Posner’s dissent cleverly 
forces the majority to find a duty to disclose running from the firm to its employee-
shareholder, which leads the court to question employment-at-will and implied duties of 
good faith and fair dealing, and how they interact with federal securities laws. The result 
is an opinion that fundamentally alters corporate law for the worse. 
The legal combat between the two judges, which the third member of the panel calls 
“lucid,” “cogent,” and “ingenious,”2 provides not only insight into Judge Posner’s legal 
mind, but also fodder for an analysis of the current state of fiduciary duties, insider 
trading law, and other corporate law puzzles. 
* * * 
                                                 
1 815 F2d 429, 444–52 (7th Cir 1987) (Posner dissenting). The case is featured in the leading casebook 
on corporate law, see William A. Klein, J. Mark Ramseyer, and Stephen M. Bainbridge, Business 
Associations: Agency, Partnerships, and Corporations 651 (Foundation, 6th ed., 2006) (concluding the 
section titled “Abuse of Control”), has been cited well over five hundred times, and is a staple of legal 
education. 
2 See id at 443 (Cudahy concurring) (agreeing that the “price-and-structure rule” should not apply to 
closely held companies, but reserving judgment as to whether it should apply to public companies). 
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Before getting to the meat of the case, it is worth pausing momentarily to consider the 
peculiarity of this case in Judge Posner’s oeuvre. For one, Posner dissents are rare; he 
dissented in only about one percent of the over 7100 cases he has heard since his 
appointment in 1981, averaging only four dissents per year.3 Courts of appeals judges 
with similar tenure are more than three times as likely to dissent.4 Posner’s low rate 
cannot obviously be explained by collegiality or practice on the Seventh Circuit—the 
court average is over three percent.5 Perhaps Posner is particularly persuasive on the 
judges he sits with, but this is the subject for another essay. 
Another reason this case is odd is that a disagreement between judges Posner and 
Easterbrook is exceptionally rare: of the over 1400 cases the two have heard together, 
they have reached different decisions only about 50 times.6 Disputes are even more rare 
when one of the two writes the majority opinion: specifically, Judge Posner has dissented 
from a majority opinion written by Judge Easterbrook only about 15 times (out of over 
300 cases where Easterbrook wrote the majority); and Judge Easterbrook has dissented 
from a majority opinion written by Judge Posner only about 19 times (out of over 380 
cases where Posner wrote the majority).7 
Posner’s dissent is even more striking since Easterbrook is one of the world’s 
foremost corporate law scholars,8 and we might expect deference from nonexpert judges 
in such cases. We can guess the reason Posner chose to fight his friend and colleague 
(both on the bench and at the University of Chicago Law School) on such sacred ground 
by their academic backgrounds and the types of arguments they make. Posner sees the 
case as one governed by employment-at-will and contract law; Easterbrook sees the case 
as one governed by corporate and federal securities law. This isn’t surprising since these 
are their respective academic specialties: Posner’s history as a scholar is primarily 
                                                 
3 All searches used the Westlaw database for the particular circuit court and were conducted February 7, 
2007; all search queries were “PANEL(name)” and “DISSENT(name)”, unless otherwise indicated. 
4 Among Judge Posner’s peers are Judges Cardamone (2 percent) and Winter (3 percent) (Second 
Circuit); Garwood (3 percent) and Higginbotham (2 percent) (Fifth Circuit); Reinhardt (7 percent) and 
Pregerson (5 percent) (Ninth Circuit); and Seymour (2 percent) (Tenth Circuit). 
5 The average number of dissents for active judges. 
6 Search query example: “PANEL(Easterbrook) & DISSENT(Posner) % DISSENT(Easterbrook)”. 
7 Search query example: “JUDGE(Easterbrook) & DISSENT(Posner)”. 
8 Shortly after Duff & Phelps was decided, Easterbrook coauthored the leading law review article to this 
day on close corporations. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, “Close Corporations 
and Agency Costs,” 38 Stan L. Rev. 271 (1986). 
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focused on the common law, while Easterbrook teaches and writes more narrowly about 
corporate and securities laws.9 We might go further and speculate that Posner’s stand 
here on common law grounds notwithstanding Easterbrook’s expertise is an attempt to 
preserve the force of common law principles and reasoning in the face of an increasingly 
specialized and federalized law, but, again, this is for another time. 
* * * 
Turning back to the case, the basic facts are as follows: Jordan worked as an 
investment analyst with Duff and Phelps (D&P), a small, private Illinois corporation. 
Like most closely held corporations, D&P had two key governance characteristics: first, 
it paid out almost all of its profits in salary, leaving a very modest dividend; and second, 
it combined risk-bearing and management functions in a very small set of individuals. 
D&P let some employees invest in firm stock—including Jordan, who by the time he 
quit held about 1 percent of the firm’s outstanding equity—but restricted their trading 
rights in order to maintain this governance model. The shareholder agreement Jordan 
signed did two things: first, it provided that employee-shareholders were subject to the 
background at-will employment regime and received no employment rights from holding 
shares; and second, it stated that employees who left the firm were required to sell back 
shares at their book value measured on a certain date.10 
The typical reason firms offer employees equity is to link their fortune to the financial 
health of the firm. But for illiquid stocks, a book-value buyout price with no ancillary 
employment rights attached is a weak mechanism to do this. Book value will 
substantially underestimate the fair value of a firm most of the time, and, as discussed 
below, there is no guarantee that minority shareholders would be entitled to share in any 
control premium paid in the event of a takeover. So although the agreement may have 
provided some slight retention and compensation incentive function (according to people 
                                                 
9 Posner’s most famous contribution to academic law is his theory of negligence and his contribution to 
the law and economics of torts and other common-law subjects, see generally Richard A. Posner, Economic 
Analysis of Law (Aspen 6th ed. 2003); Easterbrook is the coauthor of the most famous corporate law text, 
see generally Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 
(Harvard 1991)and teaches corporate law and advanced regulation of securities. 
10 Courts give firms wide latitude in crafting these agreements, even when extreme, since they serve 
several functions essential to firm formation and survival. See Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic 
Structure of Corporate Law at 228–29, 233 (cited in note 9). (“Because the firm’s principal investors also 
manage, it is often necessary to restrict the investors’ ability to alienate their shares.”) 
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familiar with D&P), the purchase of stock was more akin to a capital contribution than an 
investment—it was an obligation, not an opportunity. 
The scope of this contract was implicated when Jordan decided to leave the firm for 
personal reasons.11 He quit in November 1984, but was allowed to stay until the close of 
the year in order to receive the annual adjustment to book value made on December 31. 
All that D&P told him before he left was that the firm’s prospects looked good, and that 
he should think about sticking around. He didn’t, and in turn received book value, about 
$120 per share. 
What Jordan didn’t know was that in the months before he quit, D&P was in talks to 
sell the firm at a substantial premium over book value to Security Pacific, a publicly 
traded firm. Although that deal was dead by the time Jordan quit, other negotiations were 
contemplated. Shortly after Jordan quit, D&P publicly announced its sale to a Security 
Pacific subsidiary, which if consummated might have made Jordan’s shares worth much 
more than he was paid. 
When Jordan heard the news, he sued under the antifraud provisions of the federal 
securities laws (section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193412 and the SEC’s 
Rule 10b-513), claiming that the firm had a duty to disclose the possibility of a merger 
prior to buying his shares. He argued that the firm, as his fiduciary, could not trade 
against him with superior information. 
As it turns out, the deal with the subsidiary—like the one with the parent—fell 
through. Over a year after Jordan quit, however, D&P ultimately acquired itself in a 
management-led buyout. Had Jordan been employed by D&P at this time and had the 
deal been structured as it was, Jordan’s shares would have been valued at about $2000 
per share.   
 
                                                 
11 See Duff & Phelps, 815 F2d at 432. 
12 15 USC § 78j(b) (2000) (“It shall be unlawful . . . [t]o use or employ . . . any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe.”). 
13 17 CFR 240.10b-5(b) (1951) (“It shall be unlawful . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made . . . not misleading.”). 
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II. DUFF & PHELPS AND THE CASE LAW 
Based on the briefs, the parties thought the issue in the case was when firms have to 
disclose merger negotiations to shareholders of close corporations. The rule for public 
companies—the so-called price-and-structure rule—recognizes that disclosing too early 
might scare off potential buyers, and therefore disclosure is not required since all 
shareholders are better off ex ante under a rule of nondisclosure until the terms of the deal 
are finalized.14 Since an agreement in principle wasn’t reached until several months after 
Jordan quit, D&P argued that disclosure was unnecessary. Jordan’s case presented a 
variation on this rule, however, since one of the two firms involved, D&P, was a private 
firm. The risk of letting the cat of the bag might be smaller in this case, and therefore a 
more liberal disclosure regime might be tolerable. 
Quite to the parties’ surprise, the case turned instead on whether or not D&P could 
fire Jordan. Posner, who pushed the court in this direction, argued that since Jordan was 
employed at will, the firm could fire him at any time for any reason, including to make 
more profit for the firm or certain shareholders from the merger, and therefore disclosing 
to him the existence of a potential merger was pointless. In other words, disclosure 
requirements presume the recipient can use the information, and since Jordan couldn’t 
necessarily use it because he could be fired before acting on it, D&P had no duty to 
disclose it.15 Easterbrook’s only response was that if the firm followed this course it 
would be acting opportunistically in a way that would violate its duty of good faith and 
fair dealing toward its employee-shareholder.16 
Easterbrook is correct that even when public policy concerns are not implicated, there 
are certain instances when firing an employee is a violation of the most laissez-faire at-
will regime. The classic case is a salesman who has earned a commission but is fired 
before he can collect. The commission is payment for past performance, and courts imply 
a term of good faith and fair dealing in the parties’ employment contract if those terms 
aren’t spelled out. 
                                                 
14 See Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F2d 1185, 1195-6 (7th Cir 1987) (noting that although the rule did not 
apply under the particular facts of the case, that it is the prevailing rule for merger disclosures).  
15 See Duff & Phelps, 815 F2d at 447 (Posner dissenting). 
16 Id at 438-9. 
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The standard explanation for this rule is that courts are confident that the parties 
would have agreed to this bargain had they actually sat down and dickered over this 
possibility, and the gap-filling can reduce overall transaction costs. In other words, no 
salesman would agree to work on commission knowing that the firm could willy-nilly 
take the profits for itself, so courts can provide the efficient contract to all parties at lower 
overall cost. 
This conclusion is not obvious. For example, one might argue, contra the rule, that it 
would be reasonable for the salesman to rely on the reputation of the employer and on his 
value to the firm as a deterrent to such opportunism. Moreover, it may serve as a weapon 
for poor salesmen (or salesmen who have pushed through questionable deals) to obtain 
leverage over an employer about to fire them. Therefore, a better defense of the rule 
might be that not paying is conduct that is in direct contravention of the purpose of the 
contract: commissions are designed to motivate employees, and a rule allowing 
nonpayment is perverse because “the better the performance by the employee, the greater 
the temptation to terminate.”17 
At first blush, the analogy to this line of cases seems inapposite since Jordan’s shares 
don’t look like unpaid sales commissions but rather stock options. The typical options 
case involves an employee who is terminated prior to full vesting of his shares, meaning 
that he can’t capitalize on their rise in value. Courts hold that unvested shares are, unlike 
commissions, not “earned” until vested, and therefore firms can make employment 
decisions, even ones that make the firm or other shareholders better off at the expense of 
the employee, irrespective of any shareholding rights.18 The cases are short on reasoning, 
but we can see how the purpose of the vesting schedule—to induce the employee to 
stay—is not fundamentally frustrated by a policy allowing the firm to buy back unvested 
shares from employees whom it doesn’t want to stay. 
Duff & Phelps looks similar to the vesting cases. The book-value algorithm for 
valuation, like the vesting schedule, encouraged Jordan to perform and to stay, since he 
                                                 
17 Wakefield v. Northern Telecom, Inc, 769 F2d 109, 111–13 (2d Cir 1985) (holding that a firm cannot 
“terminate an employee for the purpose of avoiding the payment of commissions which are otherwise 
owed”). 
18 See Harrison v. NetCentric Corp, 433 Mass 465, 744 NE2d 622, 630 (2001) (“[Plaintiff’s] shares 
vested over time only if he continued to be employed; thus, the unvested shares are not earned 
compensation for past services, but compensation contingent on his continued employment.”) 
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would get a nominal return if he was fired or quit. Unlike the sales commission cases, this 
purpose is not frustrated by the firm’s option to fire bad employees. 
One difference between the vesting cases and Duff & Phelps is that Jordan’s shares 
did not get more valuable simply from the passage of time—it was as if they were 
unvested and the vesting schedule was at the discretion of the firm. If this 
characterization is fair, we might have reason to doubt that Jordan would ever agree to 
such seemingly one-sided terms. But Jordan’s contract served other purposes too. First, it 
minimized the parties’ expected ex ante contracting costs, since it eliminated, or so they 
thought, the involvement of courts in the process of determining how much shares were 
worth in the event of a departure. Many courts find this is a sufficient ground for 
upholding contracts even in cases with obvious opportunism and egregious facts.19 
Second, D&P viewed the purchase of shares as a capital contribution instead of an 
investment opportunity, making the buyback provision a form of insurance on Jordan’s 
contribution.20 Finally, as Posner points out, the contract did leave open the possibility 
that Jordan would profit from a rise in firm value, for example, if he stayed or was 
valuable enough for the firm to keep him around, and at some point a situation presented 
itself whereby someone would buy the shares for more than book value.21 Jordan thus 
would be relying on his own value and the firm’s reputation to prevent opportunism. 
None of these were purposes that would be frustrated by the firm’s “opportunism” in 
Jordan’s case. We can’t know the relative weight of these factors in the parties’ bargain, 
but the complicated mix gives us reason to doubt the court’s ability to fashion a better 
bargain than the parties’ explicit one.22  
We could stop here: Jordan’s shares look more like unvested stock options than an 
unpaid commission, and so as a doctrinal matter the implied good faith analysis of the 
                                                 
19 See, for example, Gallagher v. Lambert, 74 NY2d 562, 549 NE2d 136, 137 (1989) (“Plaintiff got what 
he bargained for—book value for his minority shares . . . . [There is] no basis presented . . . to interfere with 
the operation and consequences of this agreement between the parties.”).  
20 There was, after all, some chance that the market value of the firm’s shares might be less than book 
value when Jordan left the firm. Although unlikely, this buyout formula would protect Jordan from losing 
his capital contribution in the event the firm fell on very hard times. 
21 Duff & Phelps, 815 F2d at 448 (Posner dissenting) (arguing that “Jordan was protected by Duff and 
Phelps’ own self-interest from being exploited,” because the firm’s “principal asset” was “good will” and 
that Jordan “gambled that he was and would continue to be such a good employee that he would be 
encouraged to stay long enough to profit from the firm's growth”). 
22 Duff & Phelps, 815 F2d at 448 (Posner dissenting) (“The relationship that the parties created aligned 
their respective self-interests better than the legal protections that the court devises today.”). 
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majority is misplaced. So where did the court get its reasoning? Like most bad law, it got 
its start innocently enough in a tough case that morphed through misinterpretation and 
overextension into a general rule unjustified by the reasoning of the case on which it was 
based. It starts with a case called Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc,23 which 
Easterbrook cites approvingly.24  
In Wilkes, four people formed a corporation to own and operate a nursing home. Each 
owned equal shares, worked at the facility, and drew salaries instead of dividends. None 
of them had employment contracts or shareholding agreements. Given the potential for 
conflict and deadlock, this was not smart business planning. In fact, after a dispute, three 
decided to oust the fourth by denying him a salary (which was really disguised 
dividends), not reelecting him as a director, and buying out his shares at a very low price. 
Analogizing to partnership law, notwithstanding the fact that the parties chose the 
corporate form, the court invented an intermediate level of fiduciary duty for close 
corporations,25 and held that the firing was a breach owed by the three to the fourth. 
The outcome in Wilkes is sensible, in that the parties’ implicit bargain—to take 
salaries for menial jobs instead of dividends to reduce tax liabilities—was clearly 
frustrated by the squeeze out, and the court could therefore be confident that the parties 
would have agreed ex ante to prevent such opportunism had they negotiated over this 
possibility. Unfortunately, the court’s approach to get to the right result muddled the law 
by creating a new class of duties that have been expanded to situations far beyond the 
facts of Wilkes. 
For example, to the Duff & Phelps court, this case stands for the general proposition 
that majority shareholders owe minority shareholders the utmost duty of good faith, 
meaning they can’t fire them in order to deny them profits from a potential rise in the 
value of their shares. Whether or not we think Wilkes was rightly decided—and there are 
strong grounds to think that the creation of “hybrid” duties is terrible public policy26—
                                                 
23 370 Mass 842, 353 NE2d 657 (1976). 
24 See Duff & Phelps, 815 F2d at 438 (“[N]o one, not even Professor Epstein, doubts that an avowedly 
opportunistic discharge is a breach of contract, although the employment is at-will.”). 
25 See Wilkes, 353 NE2d at 663 (requiring careful inquiry into whether the “controlling group can 
demonstrate a legitimate business purpose” when “minority stockholders in a close corporation bring suit 
against the majority alleging a breach of the strict good faith duty owed to them by the majority.”). 
26 Making corporations look more like partnerships reduces the contracting space of parties and the 
clarity of choice of business forms. This raises overall transaction costs for promoters. 
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there are good reasons to doubt the analogy from Wilkes to Duff & Phelps, as will be 
evident when we examine Wilkes’s progeny. 
As a doctrinal matter, Wilkes’s hybridization of forms and duties is rejected by many 
courts. Delaware, for one, rejects  Wilkes on the theory that a default rule encouraging 
potential investors to negotiate for specific terms will lead to lower overall contracting 
costs when including court decision and error costs.27 This supposition is supported by 
the evidence in Duff & Phelps. The facts that led to Duff & Phelps spawned numerous 
other cases, as a variety of disgruntled former employees sued under similar theories. For 
example, an employee given a choice by D&P to keep his job or be fired for running a 
competitor business from his D&P desk sued on the ground that had he known about the 
merger possibility he would have chosen D&P over his illicit start up.28 
In this vein, an alternative holding could have relied on the voluntariness of Jordan’s 
“investment” and Delaware’s forcing rule to give Jordan only what he bargained for: at-
will employment and book value upon leaving, short of active fraud on the part of D&P. 
This would be based on the theory that Jordan could have bargained for disclosure or 
other specific informational rights before his sale, and the court should not give him these 
rights for free.29 Perhaps Jordan didn’t negotiate for these rights because they are 
valuable and he would have had to make other tradeoffs (such as a reduced salary) that he 
was unwilling to make. Or perhaps, as the fact that every shareholder signed the same 
                                                 
27 Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A2d 1366, 1379 (Del 1993) (en banc) (holding that preferring employee-
shareholders over nonemployee-shareholders does not violate any implicit duties). 
28 See Guy v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., 672 F Supp 1086, 1090–91 (ND Ill 1987). Other cases involved age 
discrimination claims and wrongful termination claims morphing into federal securities fraud cases. See, 
for example, Smith v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., 5 F3d 488, 490, 493 (11th Cir 1993) (requiring a jury trial on 
the issue of when the deceased plaintiff should have learned of D&P’s alleged fraud when the plaintiff 
claimed that “the company had coerced him into retirement by misrepresenting the company’s mandatory 
retirement age . . . to increase the per share profits of the remaining shareholders”); McLaury v. Duff and 
Phelps, Inc., 691 F Supp 1090, 1095 (ND Ill 1988) (denying summary judgment of claims similar to 
Jordan’s and a federal age discrimination claim because, among other things, “the clearance of the check 
Duff and Phelps used to pay him for his stock” satisfied the “instrumentality of interstate commerce” 
jurisdictional requirement in 15 USC § 78j(b); although McLaury’s check never left Illinois, the check-
clearing system is integrated into the national banking system).  
29 In the typical disclosure case—say, whether a homeowner should disclose something to a buyer—the 
parties are bargaining at arm’s length. In this case, the parties had a preexisting contractual relationship, 
which militated in favor of requiring the parties to bargain about the obviously foreseeable possibility of 
the firm’s value differing from book value.  
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contract suggests, Jordan lacked any bargaining power on this issue, and therefore court 
gap-filling in his favor was unwarranted.30 
It is doubtful that Jordan failed to negotiate because he was unsophisticated or 
couldn’t imagine a scenario where he would want such rights—he was an investment 
analyst, after all. In the general case, there is reason to believe that investors in close 
corporations—especially insiders like Jordan—need less protection than public 
shareholders do when it comes to bargaining or antifraud laws. Bargaining for public 
shareholders is more costly. They suffer from collective action and free-rider problems, 
higher informational costs, and other maladies, and have lower incentives to bargain in 
the first place.31 
The willingness of courts to look past the plight of sympathetic minority shareholders 
and enforce only the four corners of their shareholding contracts reached its apogee in 
Gallagher v. Lambert,32 which, had it been an Illinois precedent at the time of Duff & 
Phelps, may have been dispositive.33 An employee of a closely held firm entered into an 
employment agreement, which replicated an at-will default regime, and a buy-sell 
agreement, which provided that for the first three years of his employment (until January 
31, 1985), his shares would have to be sold back at book value, and after that date, would 
be valued under a buyback formula that would have increased his buyout price from 
about $90,000 to over $3 million. It isn’t difficult to see where this is going: on January 
10, 1985, just three weeks shy of pay dirt, the firm fired him and claimed that it only had 
to pay the pre-January 31 price for the shares. The New York Court of Appeals agreed, 
holding that the plain language of the parties’ agreement defined the fruits to which the 
employee was entitled.34 The policy purpose for this somewhat incredible result is 
                                                 
30 For a theory on why contracting parties without bargaining power should not be bailed out by courts in 
gap-filling cases, see Omri Ben-Shahar [Work in progress paper, on file with author]. 
31 See Easterbrook and Fischel, 38 Stan. L. Rev. at 277–79 (cited in note 8) (describing the different 
monitoring needs of publicly and closely held corporations as a result of their different distributions of 
management and risk-bearing). 
32 74 NY2d 562, 549 NE2d 136 (1989). 
33 See id at 138 (“There being no dispute that the employer had the unfettered discretion to fire plaintiff 
at any time, we should not redefine the precise measuring device and scope of the agreement.”). 
34 See id at 567. 
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certainty—the parties provided a formula to value the shares at all future times, and to 
disrupt this is to increase contracting costs for all parties.35  
The case looks remarkably similar to Duff & Phelps: the firm in Gallagher did 
precisely what Posner said D&P could do, and what Easterbrook admits would, if true, 
win the day for D&P. Gallagher reiterates the growing consensus of important business 
courts in New York and Delaware—and even the Massachusetts courts that started this 
mess innocently enough in Wilkes—that minority shareholders in close corporations who 
sign bad deals won’t be bailed out by the courts.36 Here again, the policy rationale is that 
these investors have the incentives and the power to bargain on their own, and therefore 
need less protection than minority shareholders in public firms. 
Posner, seeing the intuition years before the cases bear it out, makes this argument to 
a certain degree, noting that Jordan’s stockholder agreement, coupled with the at-will 
contract provided by the State of Illinois, created an arrangement (what Posner calls 
“shareholder at will”) that “is incompatible with an inference that Duff and Phelps 
undertook to keep him abreast of developments affecting the value of the firm.”37 
Easterbrook parries weakly, acknowledging that “parties may contract with greater 
specificity for . . . arrangements” other than the implied fiduciary duties the court 
imposes, but emphasizing that in this case “Jordan was an employee at will; he signed no 
contract.”38 
While true, it is hard to see why this matters. Posner rightly points out that Jordan did 
sign a stockholder agreement, which explicitly gave him no employment rights. Perhaps 
more fundamentally, it is unclear why it should matter whether Jordan and D&P signed 
an employment contract or merely availed themselves of the default contract provided by 
                                                 
35 See id (“[P]arties contract between themselves in advance so that there may be reliance, predictability, 
and definitiveness between themselves on such matters.”)[20 words. MW.]. 
36 See, for example, Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, PC, 420 Mass 404, 649 NE2d 1102, 1105 (1995) 
(finding, where an employee-shareholder with an employment contract that mimicked an at-will regime 
was bought out at a contract price far below market value, that “questions of good faith and loyalty . . . do 
not arise when all the stockholders in advance enter into agreements concerning termination of employment 
and for the purchase of stock of a withdrawing . . . stockholder” despite a fiduciary duty “of the utmost 
good faith and loyalty” among stockholders in a close corporation). 
37 Duff & Phelps, 815 F2d at 447 (Posner dissenting) (asserting that the stockholder agreement Jordan 
signed permissibly defined his rights as a shareholder with greater specificity than the “off-the-rack” 
fiduciary duty otherwise would). 
38 Duff & Phelps, 815 F2d at 436 (“It is a violation of duty to steal from the corporate treasury; it is not a 
violation to write oneself a check that the board has approved as a bonus.”). 
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state law. If all that killed an employee’s similar claim in a Massachusetts case decided 
years after Wilkes was that he signed an employment contract that provided that he was to 
be employed “until either party shall have given written notice to the other that he (it) 
wishes to terminate the contract,”39 a written contract seems like a flimsy basis for 
distinguishing Jordan’s case.  
Wilkes can also be distinguished on two other grounds. First, the four cofounders in 
Wilkes entered into no contracts relevant to how disputes would be handled, so it is 
reasonable for courts to apply standard gap-filling analysis—deciding the terms the 
parties would have agreed to had they bargained. Since it is likely that four individuals 
starting a firm together on equal terms and with equal investments would want to protect 
against precisely the type of behavior that occurred in that case, courts are not out of 
bounds in implying such obligations on coventurers. In Duff & Phelps, by contrast, the 
parties explicitly bargained about certain terms to cover potential eventualities like those 
that came to pass. While willing to bail out the undercontracted, courts are rightfully 
reluctant to intervene in cases where the parties entered into contracts touching on the 
specific issues presented in the case. 
Second, Wilkes involved significantly greater stakes from the standpoint of individual 
and societal welfare. A conflict among firm founders goes to not only the willingness of 
promoters to make large investments of capital (human and otherwise), but also the 
livelihood and financial security of the founders. In Jordan’s case, by contrast, the issue 
was not about general rules of business formation or his ability to make a living, but was 
merely a question of whether his contribution to the firm would return a reasonable 
amount or an unbelievable amount. The law, especially the costly judicial system, should 
be more aggressive in protecting the fairness of transactions that implicate business 
formation and individual high stakes, as opposed to those that we can safely assume will 
be adequately policed by market forces. Posner’s way of saying this is, in classic style, 
much pithier and wittier than we mortals can match: the court disrupts the corporate law, 
                                                 
39 Blank, 649 NE2d at 1104 (defining the terms of the employment contract referred to in note 36). See 
also Riblet Products Corp v. Nagy, 683 A2d 37, 37 (Del 1996) (“[A]lthough majority stockholders have 
fiduciary duties to minority stockholders qua stockholders, those duties are not implicated when the issue 
involves the rights of the minority stockholder qua employee under an employment contract.”). 
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he writes, over concern with “the possibility that corporations will exploit their junior 
executives, which may well be the least urgent problem facing our nation.”40  
 
III. DUFF & PHELPS AND OTHER LAW 
There are several alternative grounds on which the result in Duff & Phelps can be 
criticized, some of which Posner suggests and some left unanalyzed. 
 
A. Did Jordan Have Tag-along Rights? 
 The court’s holding rests on the assumption that Jordan, if he stayed with the firm 
until the merger was consummated, would have received a pro rata distribution of the 
merger proceeds. Easterbrook writes matter-of-factly that “[i]f Jordan had been an 
employee on [the day the merger was announced], he would have received $452,000 in 
cash.”41 This is not necessarily true. The controlling shareholders of D&P could have 
arranged a “sale” to an acquirer in several ways that would not share the spoils with 
Jordan or other minority shareholders. For example, the acquiring firm could buy a 
control stake in D&P, say 51 percent of the shares, at a price that included a control 
premium, while maintaining minority shareholders under the terms of their original 
stockholder agreements. 
There is no duty for the majority to share this premium with the minority: there are no 
rules of pro rata distribution of profits to nonselling shareholders;42 there is no “all 
holders” rule requiring offers to buy stock to be made to every shareholder on a pro rata 
basis, as there is regarding tender offers for public companies under the Williams Act;43 
and there is no basis for a suit by minority shareholders to seek disgorgement of a control 
premium.44 Tag-along rights are valuable and are readily negotiated as part of business 
                                                 
40 Duff & Phelps, 815 F2d at 449 (Posner dissenting) (lamenting the “inroads that the majority opinion 
makes on freedom of contract”). 
41 Id at 433.  
42 Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 48 NY2d 684, 397 NE2d 387, 389 (1979) (declining to entitle 
minority stockholders to a share of “any premium paid for a controlling interest in the corporation” because 
such an entitlement would “require, essentially, that a controlling interest be transferred only by means of 
an offer to all stockholders, i.e., a tender offer”). 
43 Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C. (2000 & Supp. II 2002)). 
44 In limited circumstances, shareholders can allege “oppression” as a ground for remedies in a very 
limited class of cases. See Hollis v. Hill, 232 F3d 460, 465 n 8 (5th Cir 2000) (providing three definitions 
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deals, and the fact that Jordan chose not to negotiate for them in his agreement suggests 
that the court should be reluctant to rewrite the parties’ bargain to give them to him for 
free. 
The implication of this goes to disclosure: the more likely it is that the firm can 
exclude Jordan from participating in any change-of-control premium, the less valuable 
any disclosure would be to him. Given that Jordan had no rights, necessarily, to tag 
along, and given that the merger was not a sure thing, the firm would have to tell him 
something like, “We are in negotiations for a merger that might or might not happen, and 
if it does, you might or might not get bought out at a premium.” This equivocal and 
ambiguous statement wouldn’t be of much use to Jordan, and it looks similar to the 
comment D&P made when Jordan told the firm he was quitting: “[D&P] said that the 
firm had a good potential for growth and that Jordan’s shares would rise in value if he 
stayed.”45 Of course, Jordan could ask for details about the merger, but courts generally 
bless a “no comment” policy,46 further undercutting the Duff & Phelps court’s move in 
the direction of access to equal information. 
This argument is analytically the same as Posner’s argument that Jordan’s at-will 
status made any potential disclosure worthless to him. As we have seen, the majority 
countered Posner’s argument with the claim that firing Jordan to deny him a share of the 
merger premium would be “opportunistic”,47 and was thus an untenable basis on which to 
deny him disclosure rights. The same might be said of structuring the merger in a way 
                                                                                                                                                 
of “oppression” courts have used in this context: unfair behavior by the majority, violation of fiduciary 
duty, and disappointment of the minority’s reasonable expectations). In addition, under certain deal 
structures, such as a freeze-out merger, minority shareholders can seek appraisal of the value of their 
shares, which generally, and even in Delaware, does not include a minority discount reflecting the lack of a 
control premium. See Cavalier Oil Corp v. Harnett, 564 A2d 1137, 1144 (Del 1989) (“The dissenting 
shareholder’s proportionate interest is determined only after the company as an entity has been valued. In 
that determination the Court of Chancery is not required to apply further weighting factors at the 
shareholder level, such as discounts to minority shares for asserted lack of marketability.”) This 
asymmetry—majority sellers can sell for a premium but minority shares are not discounted in an appraisal 
proceeding—is odd and may not be sensible, but this is a subject for another time. 
45 Duff & Phelps, 815 F2d at 445 (Posner dissenting). 
46 See, for example, McCormick v. Fund American Companies, Inc., 26 F3d 869, 884 (9th Cir 1994) 
(holding that firms do not have an affirmative obligation to disclose details about merger negotiations to 
executive shareholders even when pressed). 
47 For an argument that it was Jordan who was acting opportunistically by quitting and then later suing 
for a share of the merger consummated after his departure, see id at 450 (Posner dissenting) (“The majority 
says that ‘understandably Duff & Phelps did not want a viper in its nest, a disgruntled employee remaining 
only in the hope of appreciation of his stock.’ I call that ‘viper’ an opportunist.”). 
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that deprived minority shareholders of a control premium, but this is clearly not illegal. 
Despite smacking of opportunism, D&P and its merger partner could exclude Jordan 
from that which the court tells him he is entitled to receive. It is difficult to see why 
Jordan’s employment status should be protected by federal securities laws (i.e., the court 
implies that he can’t be fired to make other shareholders better off), when he bargained 
for no additional employment rights, and when other rights of the firms and shareholders 
involved allow them to take the premium regardless of Jordan’s employment status.  
Given the close similarity of this argument to Posner’s at-will argument, it is 
somewhat odd that he did not make it. Perhaps he viewed it as too speculative given the 
facts as they transpired—the buyer of D&P eventually paid the same price for each and 
every share of stock. But it is possible that the buyer did this only because it knew it was 
not buying the shares of Jordan and the other employees who quit or were fired around 
the same time. We cannot know what the buyer of D&P would have done had it known 
of the court’s holding before structuring the transaction, but it is certainly possible that it 
would have designed the transaction differently. In any event, this possibility is not 
substantively different or more speculative than Posner’s argument that D&P could 
theoretically fire Jordan, notwithstanding that it showed no signs of that inclination, 
choosing instead to be nice to him as he was leaving. 
Furthermore, the transaction-structuring possibility raises the question of what D&P 
should have done differently in this case. Given that D&P could have structured Jordan 
out of any merger upside, what should D&P have told Jordan? The rule the court 
announces mandates that firms tell employee-shareholders about mergers that might 
happen, notwithstanding the fact that there is nothing in law or in fact that suggests that 
minority shareholders must participate in the fruits of such transactions. 
The mischief here should be obvious. Say that D&P, believing that the initial merger 
pending with Security Pacific would go through (it did not), told Jordan that he would 
participate on a pro rata basis in the merger, and therefore he should stick around.48 If the 
deal fell through (which it did), and a subsequent buyer offered to buy only the shares of 
a majority of holders, Jordan may have sued for a share of the control premium on 
                                                 
48 Even silence here—“we might merge, which might be good for you”—yields the same result, since 
Jordan might reasonably assume from silence as to specifics that he would participate in any premium. 
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fraudulent inducement grounds or a theory of promissory estoppel. D&P obviously did 
not want to, at the preliminary negotiations stage, lock itself into a particular deal 
structure since this would potentially destroy overall shareholder value. In this light, the 
choice to be ambiguous seems fairly sensible. 
Perhaps more interestingly, the court-mandated obligation to disclose decreases the 
flexibility of the firm to make employment decisions at a crucial period in its existence, 
something that may make the firm less valuable to any potential acquirer, and therefore 
destroy value for shareholders as a group. We might therefore expect shareholders to 
agree to permit non-disclosure to bad employees (since it increases overall shareholder 
value), and rely on their own performance to keep them valuable to the firm. 
To understand this, consider D&P’s options for how to treat each shareholder-
employee when faced with a buyout offer. D&P—or, more accurately, the buyer—would 
logically want to take along employees whose value to the new firm would exceed the 
costs of their continued employment. Importantly, the buyer and seller may have different 
views on this. Requiring disclosure to all D&P employees, regardless of whether they 
will be valuable to the new firm, and limiting the ability to fire employees in the pre-
consummation period (what the majority says would be opportunistic conduct), means 
that even “bad” employees (from the perspective of the buyer) will be guaranteed to 
profit from the merger and to have jobs with the acquirer, for a while at least. In other 
words, Jordan might be viewed as a bad employee to the buyer (because he was showing 
his disloyalty to the firm by quitting), and would therefore be precisely the type of 
employee who a buyer would want to cut out of the deal’s upside, but can’t.49 Duff & 
Phelps is wrongheaded insofar as it suggests that firms can’t fire the Jordans of the world 
regardless of the employer’s or buyer’s assessment of their value. The rule in effect 
freezes employment decisions during this period, and forces buyers that want to deny the 
control premium to particular employees to do so through complex deal structuring. The 
efficiency of such a forcing rule is highly suspect, and is a consideration the court utterly 
ignores. 
 
                                                 
49 In the several cases that arose from the buyout(s) of D&P, each plaintiff-employee had acted in a way 
that showed disloyalty to the firm or that the employee’s value to the firm was very low. See cases cited in 
note 28.  
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B. Did Jordan Consent to Being Traded against with Superior Information? 
One thing upon which Easterbrook and Posner agree is that the parties could, through 
contract, waive any duties to disclose; they simply disagree about whether Jordan did so 
in this case. This is a pretty remarkable leap, as it seems to run afoul of the ban on waiver 
found in both the law of fiduciaries50 and the securities laws.51 It is also the most 
noteworthy aspect of the case because it predicts (by about two decades) the Supreme 
Court’s analysis in United States v. O’Hagan.52 
As a general matter, federal insider-trading law looks to state law for the existence of 
a duty to be breached; in the absence of a clear duty—one, for example, founded on a 
fiduciary relationship—there can be no liability from the use of material, nonpublic 
information. In O’Hagan, the Court held that even when there is such a duty, disclosure 
of trading intentions eliminates liability (at least under the misappropriation theory), since 
deception is a crucial element of liability that is negated by consent.53  
The view that securities laws are waivable (to some extent) by contractual definition 
of rights at the state-law level, is more readily accepted after O’Hagan, but when Posner 
first suggested it in Duff & Phelps, it was a radical notion. As a normative matter, it is a 
perfectly sensible conclusion. Given the benefits of private ordering in business 
formation, courts encourage parties to freely contract under state law to arrange the 
affairs of closely held firms. If those contracts create specific rights and obligations that 
include exceptions to equal treatment or other fiduciary-imposed standards, the federal 
laws that piggyback on state law duties should adjust accordingly. As long as the parties 
to a face-to-face securities transaction are sophisticated—have access to information, can 
ask questions, and don’t otherwise need special protection—there is no reason why they 
                                                 
50 See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 Duke L. J., 
879, 887 (“[F]iduciary obligation sometimes operates precisely in opposition to intention as manifest in 
express agreements.”) If it is true that majority shareholders owe minority shareholders “fiduciary duties,” 
as typically understood in the trust context, these are not waivable. See id at 923 (“A provision in a trust 
instrument cannot relieve a trustee of liability for any profit derived from a breach of trust . . ..”) But here 
corporate law may be simply sloppy, and “fiduciary duties” might just mean something else—an obligation 
to refrain from self-dealing—that may be waived in certain cases. 
51 Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 USC § 78cc(a) (2000) (“Any condition, 
stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of 
any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void.”). 
52 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 US 642, 655 (1997). 
53 Id at 653-4. 
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should not be able to waive explicit or implicit duties owed to them by the other 
transacting party. 
A recent court of appeals case is illustrative. In McCormick v. Fund American 
Companies, Inc.,54 an executive and large shareholder sold his shares back to the firm 
prior to retirement. Before doing so, he asked the firm for specific information related to 
pending merger talks but the firm declined and he sold. Later, when the merger came to 
pass, he sued under Rule 10b-5, just like Jordan. The court rejected his claim, noting that 
the executive’s knowledge of what he didn’t know amounted to a waiver of any claims 
that the firm had a duty to disclose.55 This holding butts right up against Duff & Phelps, 
in that it would be strange to suggest that a “no comment” policy could insulate a firm 
from the Duff & Phelps rule. 
The reasoning in McCormick provides the foundation for much over-the-counter 
securities practice today, including the use of “big boy” letters, which state that the 
parties know that one of them may have more information but since the parties are “big 
boys,” they agree to waive any claims arising out of the information asymmetry. Courts 
have, by and large, upheld these provisions as enforceable, if not as a claim waiver of any 
securities law violations, at least as a nonreliance provision that undercuts any fraud 
claim.56 
The contract Jordan signed has the spirit of an ex ante waiver or version 1.0 “big boy” 
letter. By agreeing to take book value, Jordan was in effect consenting to trades with the 
firm at a set price in cases in which one or both parties would know that the fair value of 
the shares exceeded book value. Although it was theoretically possible that the shares 
would be worth book value (or less) when Jordan left the firm and had to sell them back, 
this was an unlikely possibility at the time of contracting, since enterprise value exceeds 
                                                 
54 26 F3d 869 (9th Cir 1994). 
55 See id. at 884 (noting the background knowledge the plaintiff had as a “sophisticated businessman” 
who was at the time a former CEO of a subsidiary of the defendant and a current member of the 
defendant’s board). 
56 See, for example, Harsco Corp v. Segui, 91 F3d 337, 341–48 (2d Cir 1996) (affirming dismissal for 
lack of reasonable reliance where sophisticated parties carefully delineated representations that were and 
were not made); Jensen v. Kimble, 1 F3d 1073, 1074 (10th Cir 1993) (affirming summary judgment where 
defendants advised plaintiffs that nondisclosed information would not be revealed, rendering nondeceptive 
their failure to disclose). But see AES Corp v. Dow Chemical Co., 325 F3d 174, 180 (3d Cir 2003) 
(refusing to hold as a matter of law that nonreliance provisions are sufficient to immunize any Rule 10b-5 
claims). 
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book value in most cases of firms that are not distressed or in bankruptcy.57 This 
argument is even more powerful when we consider the standard industry practice of 
using the amount paid to purchase the shares, which is often nominal ($0.01), as the 
buyout price. In this case, every state of the world in which a buyout happens will involve 
informational asymmetries akin to those that the Duff & Phelps court holds give rise to 
federal liability. 
The only upside of the Duff & Phelps rule is that it might force the parties to bargain 
more specifically over disclosure—for example, by using an explicit “big boy” letter—
but this is a costly overlay to what appears to already be a fairly struck bargain, and it 
raises overall transaction costs since it allows courts room to intervene in cases where 
they find the terms of the bargain or the implementation unfair. Since parties cannot 
know these exact contours in advance, the result is more uncertainty and higher 
contracting costs. 
 
C. Can There Be “Insider Trading” in Options? 
Jordan’s stockholder agreement was an options contract: Jordan sold a call option to 
D&P, giving the firm the right to buy his shares at book value at any time; and bought a 
put option from D&P, giving him the right to sell his shares at book value at any time.58 
In effect, Jordan bought insurance against a decline in firm value (Jordan’s put), while 
being able to capitalize on an increase in firm value, subject to his remaining valuable to 
and staying with the firm (the firm’s call). Thus, the fundamental legal/policy question in 
the case is whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing should apply to 
these types of options contracts. 
Insider-trading law has bite for run-of-the-mill options contracts only at the time of 
purchase. In the classic case, a statutory insider who has material, nonpublic information 
buys or sells options in order to profit from knowledge that the price of the underlying 
                                                 
57 The average ratio of market value to book value for the largest 7000 firms in the United States in 2006 
was over 5, with a median of 2; only distressed or bankrupt firms are the exception. For financial services 
firms, like D&P, the average is near 8, with a median of 1.5. Data available at 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/data.html (visited February 7, 2007). 
58 Posner recognizes this essential feature. See Duff & Phelps, 815 F2d at 447 (Posner dissenting) (“By 
signing the stockholder agreement Jordan gave Duff and Phelps in effect an option . . . to buy back his 
stock at any time at a fixed price.”). 
21 
stock is going to rise or fall.59 There is no claim in Duff & Phelps that there were 
actionable informational asymmetries at the time Jordan signed his shareholder 
agreement. If there were such a claim, Duff & Phelps would be easy and uninteresting. 
The other relevant time period for options contracts is when the rights granted under 
them are executed. But for typical options there can be no liability here because the price 
must have already moved to its publicly informed price in order to profit under the 
option, and therefore there is no insider trading, just exercising the agreed-to rights. The 
only relevant or sensible time to ask whether the holder violated Rule 10b-5 is at the time 
the option contract was executed. 
Duff & Phelps offers a wrinkle: the option exercise was tied to employment and the 
illiquidity makes value more difficult to determine. As a doctrinal matter, the operative 
question when employment and shareholding are lumped together is whether 
shareholding is incidental to employment or vice versa. The seminal case is Ingle v. 
Glamore Motor Sales, Inc.,60 where the court held that employment law, in this case an 
at-will regime, trumped any obligations arising from share ownership when an employee 
was only incidentally a shareholder.61 The policy logic is, as discussed above, that 
foundational contracts and parties warrant greater protection than employees brought in 
later who are primarily employees and not owners. 
Another reason for separation of employee and shareholder rights is the 
unworkability of a rule that layers securities fraud on employment decisions like those in 
Duff & Phelps. Consider the case of D&P’s CEO, who signed the same contract Jordan 
did, and who is contemplating retirement. Inevitably the CEO will have private 
information about the true value of the firm: specifically, whether it exceeds, is the same 
as, or is less than book value. Under the Duff & Phelps rule, the only time the CEO could 
make a retirement choice free from potential civil (or even criminal!) liability is when he 
knew that the value was the same as, or not materially different from, book value. (Hint: 
never.) Since it would be impossible to make the retirement decision independently from 
                                                 
59 Many of the most famous insider trading cases involve options trading of this kind. See O’Hagan, 521 
US at 647–48 (using options to capitalize on nonpublic knowledge of a firm’s client’s planned tender offer 
for the Pillsbury Company).  
60 73 NY2d 183, 535 NE2d 1311 (1989). 
61 Id at 1313 (“A minority shareholder in a close corporation . . . who contractually agrees to the 
repurchase of his shares upon termination . . . acquires no right from the corporation . . . against at-will 
discharge.”). 
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knowledge of firm value, the only choice would be to take the decision away from the 
executive, which seems fanciful. 
Here is where the Ingle rule has traction: In cases where shareholding is not ancillary 
to employment, like in Wilkes, then courts will impose fairness restrictions on how 
promoter-shareholders can deal with each other. In cases where employees are merely 
given shares as compensation or retention tools of the firm, the courts will force the 
parties to contract and will enforce the letter of those contracts. 
Firms faced with the Duff & Phelps rule might do one of several things. First, they 
might simply give less equity to employees, or they might tie buyouts to some fairly 
determined “market” price (which is the same thing). It isn’t clear at all that this is a 
desirable policy objective. Second, they might freeze all employment decisions when the 
firm is in periods of uncertain future value. This, of course, is not only hugely inefficient, 
but also impossible to implement—how would a firm forbid an employee from quitting? 
It seems far better to require firms to follow a general rule—like the price-and-structure 
rule—and refrain from actively misleading employee-shareholders. This preserves 
freedom of contract at the agreement and employment decision time. Some employees 
will win, by timing exit decisions well, and others, like Jordan, will lose. But this 
eventuality should be apparent at the time the parties write the contract, and if individual 
employees want greater protection, they can bargain for it. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION  
In Duff & Phelps, Posner is at his best and perhaps at his worst. His reasoning 
eclipses the narrow issues presented by the facts, making compelling arguments about a 
range of issues that courts would not otherwise come around to, if at all, for decades. His 
style is breezy, witty, and draws on a range of legal materials and types of thinking. 
When you read the opinion, you think how fun it would be to be his colleague or clerk—
although not necessarily one of the litigants. The downside is that his analytical and 
doctrinal innovations propel the court into a holding that eats up more legal space than it 
needs to, and creates a set of unneeded and nettlesome duties that make corporate law 
less clear and certain. 
23 
On the merits, Jordan’s contract, which was the same as every employee-shareholder, 
would not be fundamentally frustrated by the lack of an implied term—as in the salesman 
commission cases. The courts should be less confident about reading in contractual terms 
since Jordan did bargain, unlike in Wilkes, and was primarily an employee, as opposed to 
a founder-shareholder. Although Duff & Phelps is still good law, subsequent cases, like 
Gallagher, have carved back on its reach. Posner’s genius was to see the path of the law 
in advance of its march. His dissent, although cited in a nontrivial number of cases, did 
not provide the explicit intellectual or doctrinal foundation of any of these cases, but his 
reasoning can be said to have predicted their results. 
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